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What is Hardware Security? 
•  Many of the issues of hardware security are similar to 
traditional computer security 
–  Malware, authentication, program analysis, patches, insiders, 
social engineering, developmental attacks, evaluation, 
certification and accreditation, flawed implementations, 
protocols, system-level issues, network security, usability, 
economic incentives, complexity. 
•  Anything can be hacked, but the attacker has finite resources.  
–  Shades of grey rather than black-and-white (“broken” or not) 
–  Make attackers toil, and design systems that “win” decisively 
–  Each security technique has its advantages and disadvantages, 
and we must understand each technique's limitations. Even 
crypto has limitations. We need to know what specific attacks 
each technique is capable of preventing.  
What is Hardware Security? 
•  Opportunities of hardware 
–  High performance 
•  Custom processors for crypto, deep packet inspection, 
etc. 
–  Direct control 
–  No intermediate OS layers 
–  Physical separation 
•  Challenges 
–  Semantic gap 
–  Engineering and fabrication costs 
What is Hardware Security? 
•  Foundry Trust 
–  Malicious Hardware (a.k.a. “gate-ware”) 
•  Trojan Horse, Rootkit, Kill Switch 
–  Design Theft (Protecting Intellectual Property) 
–  Start with a secure design before addressing fabrication security 
•  Operational Attacks 
–  Power Analysis, Fault Injection, Heating, Optical 
–  Cold Boot, Probing, Math Errors 
•  Developmental Attacks 
–  Malicious Design Tools 
–  Malicious IP 
•  System Assurance 
–  Security Architecture, Key Management, PUFs 
–  Formal analysis of IP cores (not a panacea) 
What is Hardware Security? 
•  Interfaces [Schaumont 2009] 
–  Secure hardware is part of a bigger system. 
–  Secure hardware interfaces are tricky: 
•  How do you distinguish red wires from black wires?  
–  Secure hardware interfaces do not exist yet!  
–  Current secure hardware serves software 
•  Composition [Schaumont 2009] 
–  This is not trivial.  
–  To resist side channels, you must avoid redundancy.  
–  However, fault tolerance requires increasing redundancy.  
–  How can you build fault-tolerant, side channel resistant systems? 
•  Metrics [Schaumont 2009] 
–  Security is dimensionless.  
–  Metrics are absolutely necessary to do meaningful research. 
–  Without metrics, it is impossible to analyze trade-offs. 
•  Education: Electrical Engineers are trained to make things happen 
rather than to make bad things NOT happen [Schaumont 2009] 
What is 3Dsec? 
•  Economics of High Assurance 
–  High NRE Cost, Low Volume 
–  Gap between DoD and Commercial 
•  Disentangle security from the COTS 
–  Use a separate chip for security 
–  Use 3-D Integration to combine: 
•  3-D Control Plane 
•  Computation Plane 
–  Need to add posts to the COTS chip design 
•  Dual use of computation plane 
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Goal: Build trustworthy systems using 
commercial hardware components 
Problem: Integrating specialized security 
mechanisms is too costly for hardware 
vendors 
Idea: Augment commodity hardware after 
fabrication with a separate layer of security 
circuitry  
 
Anticipated Benefits:  
Configurable, protected, low-cost hardware 
security controls that can override activity in 
the commodity hardware 
Privacy Applications: 
Detect and intercept the execution of 
malicious code 
Prevent the microprocessor internals from 
being exploited to leak crypto keys 
Tag and Track private information as it flows 
through a processor 
Pro’s and Con’s 
•  Why not use a co-processor? On-chip? 
•  Pro’s 
–  Bandwidth 
–  The ability to override 
•  Con’s 
–  Cooling 
–  Manufacturing yield 
Cost 
•  Cost of fabricating systems with 3-D 
–  Fabricating and testing the security layer 
–  Bonding it to the host layer 
–  Fabricating the vias 
–  Testing the joined unit 
Ramifications 
•  Device and Packaging Level 
•  Circuit Level 
•  Architectural 
•  Systems Software Level 
•  Application Level 
Problems 
•  What if the control plane is manufactured in a 
different process than the computation 
plane? 
•  The computation plane must function as 
normal in the absence of the the control 
plane, but must behave differently when the 
control plane is present. 
•  I/O and programming the control plane 
•  Actively interfering with the computation 
plane (timing issues) 
•  What to cut in the computation plane? 
Goals 
•  Cost and performance analysis 
–  Thermal/performance/cost model 
–  FPGA prototypes 
•  Circuit-level modifications 
–  Timing and power feasibility 
–  Optimal placement/cost for commodity cores 
–  Automatic insertion with CAD tools 
•  Partition, place, optimize 
Circuit-Level Modifications 






•  Architectural structures 
–  Memory (caches, predictors, scratchpad) 
–  General logic (interconnect, controllers) 
•  End-to-end evaluation 
–  Validate methods with design examples 
–  Cache study, cache monitor 
–  System-level security analysis 
–  Dynamic management of 3-D control plane 
Applications 
•  Information flow tracking 
•  Protection mechanism 
–  Cache side channels 
•  Safe context switch 
•  Secure alternate service 
•  Instrumentation 
•  Optimal architecture for a given application 
Broader Impact 
•  Economics of hardware security 
•  Use commodity processors 
•  Applicable to a wide variety of platforms 
•  Education 
•  Interdisciplinary scope 
•  Multiple universities 
•  Attract students to the field 




•  Additional slides 
Low-level architecture 







































•  Tapping, Re-routing, Overriding, Disabling 














•  Cache monitor 
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